Egypt, Greece, and Israel Take the Lead on Europe’s Energy Supply

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The East Mediterranean can enhance Europe’s energy security and reduce its dependence on Russian gas. Regional countries are strongly positioned to face oncoming challenges in the global energy markets and efficiently deliver on the European continent’s gas demands.

Egypt is well-situated to increase its gas exports to Europe, but one major constraint is that European countries either lack LNG terminals or existing terminals have a limited capacity to receive supplies. It is thus imperative for European countries to upgrade existing terminals or construct new ones to expand their capacity to receive LNG.

Egypt Dominates the Region’s Energy Successes

New gas findings in Egypt can turn into commercial discoveries that will be transported to Europe. The discovery of Nargis-1 exploration well, co-owned by American Chevron and Italian ENI in the Nargis Offshore Area Concession, is estimated to contain almost 200 net feet (61 m) of Miocene and Oligocene gas. Also important, German Wintershall Dea made a new gas discovery within the Disouq concession in the onshore Nile Delta region that has been tested at a peak production of 15 million cubic feet of gas per day.

Egypt has almost 2.21 trillion cubic meters of proven gas reserves, and it produced more than 95 billion cubic meters in 2021, with exports exceeding 12 billion cubic meters annually.

With an eye to regional energy cooperation that will benefit Europe, Egypt prioritized the demarcation of maritime boundaries with countries like Greece and Cyprus, aiming to extract greater volumes of regional gas through joint exploration and to link national pipelines. This is evidenced in the letter and spirit of the partial delimitation agreement that was signed between Egypt and Greece in August 2020.

According to Article 2 of the agreement “in case there are natural resources, including hydrocarbons reservoirs, extending from the Exclusive Economic Zone of one Party to the Exclusive Economic Zone of the other, the two Parties shall cooperate in order to reach an agreement on the modalities of the exploitation of such resources”. Overall, the Egypt-Greece demarcation agreement has created a positive precedent for other regional countries to emulate.

The Euro-Africa Interconnector, labeled as Project of Common Interest by the EU, supports Egyptian and Greek aspirations to become major energy hubs for Southeast Europe. The project aims to transport by a subsea cable renewable electricity generated in Egypt and other African countries through Greece to Europe. Already, Egypt has completed interconnection projects with Libya, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia.

Greece: An Active Player in Europe’s Energy Transformation

Greece is exploring ways to bring regional gas to Europe, as the proposed East Mediterranean Gas Pipeline may prove technically challenging and thus less likely to materialize. Athens accelerated efforts to execute projects of regional and European interest like the Euro Asia Interconnector, a key infrastructure project that links the grids of Israel, Cyprus and Greece with the European power grid delivering up to 2000 megawatts of energy and thus enhancing European energy security. Nexans, a global player in energy transition, has been recently awarded a contract valued at 1,6 billion dollars for the section of the Euro Asia Interconnector that will connect Cyprus to Greece via a subsea cable that will cross ultra-deep waters of over 3,000 meters.

Greece also pays high importance to other infrastructure projects, including an onshore 28-kilometer gas transmission pipeline that connects the National Gas Transmission System to the Alexandroupolis Floating Storage and Regasification Unit in northern Greece, through which 5.5 bcm of gas per year will be funneled to the Balkans and to Southeast Europe. Deliveries of 28 kilometres of pipes were completed in May 2023 by Corinth Pipeworks that was awarded a contract by Saipem S.p.A for the development of the offshore and onshore gas pipeline by Gastrade. An additional infrastructure project, with Greece at its epicenter, that will form the European Hydrogen backbone is the construction of a 160-kilometer gas pipeline in western Macedonia that can transport up to 100 percent hydrogen.

Regarding hydrocarbon exploration, the Greek government has compiled an action plan that centers on the completion of seismic surveys and drilling at the offshore blocks in the Ionian Sea and south of Crete, already conceded to oil majors. The Hellenic Hydrocarbon Resources Management Authority has identified more than 30 maritime blocks with a total estimated quantity of recoverable gas ranging between 2 and 2.55 trillion cubic meters. Significant volumes of gas, once extracted from Greek maritime blocks, will be funneled to Europe.

Israel’s Energy Independence Creates Opportunities

Israel, for its part, can export to Europe surplus gas of approximately 500 billion cubic meters (bcm) over the next two decades. Notably, Israel has achieved energy independence over the last years that created a shield against the energy crisis which was triggered by the war on Ukraine. Israel therefore accelerates efforts to identify new gas discoveries by offering 20 new exploration blocks in the context of its 4th International Offshore Licensing Round. As announced recently by Israel’s ministry of Energy, four consortia of companies submitted bids to obtain licenses for gas exploration within Israeli waters.

The Israeli aim lies in increasing gas volumes for export to third markets. According to the Israeli perspective, the war on Ukraine provides a golden opportunity for regional countries that are not aligned with radical Islam to produce and jointly funnel gas to Europe. The latter can also help regional countries come together and draft long-term energy cooperation agreements that will benefit the economies of all involved.

The Turkish dimension cannot be ignored in Israel’s regional calculations. The construction of a pipeline to transport Israeli gas to Turkey could help the latter diversify energy resources, especially considering that contracts with Russia and Iran will expire within the next four years. Even though the Turkey-Israel pipeline is technically, and financially feasible, political considerations have so far impeded its execution, namely Ankara’s regional revisionism and unpredictability towards Israel. Noteworthy, Turkey seeks to import East Mediterranean gas to meet its increasing domestic needs rather than export it to Europe.

Challenges and Policy Recommendations

Overall, there are several solutions to upgrading the supply of energy from the East Mediterranean to Europe, thus enhancing the latter’s energy security. Skepticism, however, prevails in European political circles regarding the likelihood of Libya as a feasible energy supply option for Europe, despite the low extraction cost of Libyan gas and oil compared to other East Mediterranean countries. The highly unstable situation in Libya is the prime factor impeding European energy operators from engaging with Libyan authorities.

It is with no doubt that East Mediterranean countries must be locked into a broader European strategy that provides a win-win situation by which cooperation profits every party. To this end, Egypt should expand its capacity for processing and exporting LNG to Europe, not only to offset a sharp decrease in gas imports from Russia, but also to increase revenues of the Egyptian state budget.

Hydrogen and renewables can prove to be game changers in the next two decades for Europe. It is in this context that Greece should swiftly proceed with cementing its energy partnership with Saudi Arabia so that Athens can facilitate massive imports of hydrogen from the Saudi Neom region to Europe.

Israel should explore the possibility of a floating LNG terminal in Israeli waters, as this option is feasible now that, due to the Israel-Lebanon demarcation agreement, the threat of naval escalation between the two countries has passed.

Evidently, East Mediterranean countries namely Egypt, Greece and Israel played an early role in reducing European dependence on Russian energy and can potentially play a larger role through coordinated efforts to becoming credible gas suppliers to Europe. It is in the hands of the three East Mediterranean countries to establish a rock-solid energy partnership that will benefit all.

The War on Ukraine Accelerates Europe’s Quest for East Mediterranean Energy

Antonia Dimou is Head of the Middle East Unit at the Institute for Security and Defense Analyses, Greece; and, an Associate at the Center for Middle East Development, University of California, Los Angeles

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The East Mediterranean can play an increased role in Europe’s energy security as several resources in the region could be unlocked taking into consideration the ongoing war on Ukraine and the European Union (EU) intention to reduce reliance on Russian energy.

The EU imported almost 45 percent of its gas from Russia in 2021 before the war on Ukraine, accounting to 155 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually. Energy supply disruptions because of Russia’s war on Ukraine resulted in fourfold surge in energy market prices. A total cessation of Russian supplies could plunge Europe into recession. It is thus imperative that Europe identifies long-term solutions to ensure that it is not entrapped in a future energy crisis. Equally important, Europe will need gas as a backup for renewable energy.

Green hydrogen generated by renewable energy or from low-carbon power is also key for the energy transition. Transport pipelines would be a necessary component of a future hydrogen economy. Therefore, Europe must invest in new gas and green hydrogen development projects; the question is, “Where?”

The answer lies in that the European Union must make a “strategic decision” to invest in East Mediterranean gas. Investment in East Mediterranean gas has the benefit of encouraging and cementing regional stability, strengthening member states, and helping Europe transition from Russian to indigenous and other proximate sources of energy. But Europe must commit to new long-term contracts despite its reluctancy to sign 15-20-year contracts for natural gas because of its declared strategy to be climate-neutral by 2050.

Egypt and Israel Serve as Credible Gas Suppliers to Europe

With an eye to importing regional gas, the EU has concluded a joint Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Egypt and Israel, whereby Egypt will liquify Israeli natural gas and ship it to the European Union. Per the terms of the MoU, supplies will increase from 5 bcm to 7 bcm in 2023 and subsequent years.

Quantities can increase further, as the utmost of Israeli and Egyptian production capacity has yet to be realized. Israel has an additional 500 bcm of gas available to export and can provide Europe with 10-15 bcm annually if new investment in pipelines and liquefaction facilities materializes. The dividends of the MoU’s execution are multifold ranging from Egypt’s economic recovery to Israel’s energy security.

The sale of gas provides the Egyptian government with the foreign currency it needs to sustain its 100-million population. The sale of gas also solidifies Israel’s relations with Europe at its time of need. Overall, the tripartite MoU can prove to be a gamechanger in Israel’s and Egypt’s relations with the European Union.

Energy as a Golden Opportunity for Cyprus

Greece and Cyprus can also present alternative sources of energy supply to Europe. For its part, Cyprus can supply Europe with 8 bcm annually from Aphrodite gas field. American major Chevron announced the acceleration of development plans after the recent successful drilling of an appraisal well on the Aphrodite field offshore Cyprus. But this is the tip of the iceberg. Cyprus has discovered reserves of approximately 700 bcm in the Cronos–1 well drilled in Block 6; in Calypso within Block 7; and, in Glaucus find in block 10 of Cyprus’s Exclusive Economic Zone.

Energy supplies from these discoveries should be either shipped to Egypt for liquefaction and export to Europe or directed at the Liquefied Natural Gas Receiving and Regasification Terminal in the Vasilikos area of Cyprus that is expected to be operational in October 2023.

An additional option is the construction of a subsea pipeline from gas fields in Israel to Cyprus where gas will be converted to LNG and then shipped to Europe. This has been a proposal initially made by Greek medium-sized energy company Energean Oil & Gas that owns several fields in Israel and has been embraced by the Israeli and Cypriot leaderships.

This project has all the components of a bankable deal, according to Vitol, the world’s largest independent oil, gas, and commodities trader that has expressed interest in exporting the LNG to Europe.

Greece is Set to Start off Gas Exploration

Greece is a prime regional player who can serve as an energy producer and transit hub. Greece is a country that has some promising energy resources that are documented in 3-D seismic surveys conducted in the Ionian Sea and in South and Southwest Greece back in 2013.

Estimates by petroleum geologists, engineers and energy economists indicate that a possible volume of 10 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of gas lies in the sea areas south and in south and southwest of Crete and other areas mostly located in deep and ultra-deep Greek sea waters.

The war on Ukraine triggered a decision by the Greek government for an action plan that centres on the completion of seismic surveys and on drilling at the offshore blocks in the Ionian Sea and south of Crete, that are already conceded to American Exxon Mobil and Hellenic Petroleum. The Hellenic Hydrocarbon Resources Management company (EDEY) estimates there is sufficient time for the development of the natural gas fields throughout Greece.

The case of the super-giant Zohr gas field in Egypt is cited as an example to emulate as its commercial utilization took less than two-and-a-half years after the completion of the seismic surveys. The geological structures in fields west and southwest of Crete resemble to those of Egyptian Zohr and the Israeli Leviathan gas fields.

Revithousa and Alexandroupolis as Primary LNG Hubs

Greece also aims to turn itself into an energy-transit county. It is an EU member state closest to the Caspian Sea’s gas reserves and the gate for Israeli, Egyptian and Cypriot gas reserves to continental Europe. With the deterioration of EU-Russian relations due to the war on Ukraine, Greece is the main entrance of alternative gas reserves to Europe.

The Revithousa LNG Terminal, located southwest of Athens, has been upgraded twice to manage bigger LNG volumes and maintain increased LNG gasification capacity in order to reinforce security of the gas supply for the country and the extended region. The terminal already receives American LNG shipments, highlighting the prospect of Greece becoming a bigger LNG importer than pipe-gas importer in accordance with the ongoing transformation of global LNG markets. Increased LNG shipments received at the Revithoussa terminal have maintained the energy market of Bulgaria since April 2022 when Gazprom decided to deprive the Balkan country by 90% of its gas needs. As consequence, Bulgaria searched for alternative sources of supply and currently receives quantities of 90,000-100,000 megawatt hours of natural gas through Greece.

In addition, the swift construction of the Offshore Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) in the city of Alexandroupolis in Northeast Greece for the transfer of LNG to the Balkans and Southeast Europe has attracted American and European support. The reason is that it enhances the diversification of Europe’s energy supply and the funneling of American LNG to the wider region. Alexandroupolis terminal is expected to be operational in December 2023. The Alexandroupolis floating LNG terminal will provide 5.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas annually to the markets of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and North Macedonia. Evidently, this kind of infrastructure projects can change the energy map of Europe and turn Greece into a regional energy hub.

Energean Enters the Regional Energy Club

Greece develops indigenous energy resources, but it has also managed, through Greek medium sized energy company Energean Oil & Gas, to penetrate the Israeli and Egyptian energy landscape. Greek Energean has been pivotal in the development of the Israeli gas market as it currently holds eight exploration blocks offshore Israel and has facilitated competition in the Israeli market.

Karish and Karish North were discovered in 2013 and 2019 respectively and are jointly developed with four wells tied to a new-build floating production storage and offloading FPSO vessel, called the ‘Energean Power’. The commercial discovery made in the Athena exploration well in 2022 that is situated between the Karish and Tanin fields, has indicated that the well contains recoverable gas volumes of 8 bcm on a standalone basis. Athena can thus enhance the profitability of the Karish-Tanin development.

Energean is therefore actively pursuing options for the commercialization of the wider maritime area, that can be identified as follows: First, additional domestic Israeli gas sales, for example spot sales. Second, enhancement of exports. For example, turning the Memorandum of Understanding (“MoU”) signed with the Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company (“EGAS”) for the supply of up to 3 bcm annually into a binding agreement.

A Final Note

Unquestionably, Israel, Egypt, Cyprus, and Greece are uniquely positioned countries that either develop indigenous and regional gas fields or in position to transport energy from the East Mediterranean to Europe. To this end, the engines of energy cooperation are lit, demonstrating that regional partnerships can serve as co-designers of a grand European energy strategy.

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With vast energy resources, Turkmenistan is a strategically located nation in Central Asia. The natural gas industry is Turkmenistan’s principal source of hydrocarbons; the country has the fourth-largest natural gas reserves in the world, and hydrocarbon exports make up more than 25% of its gross domestic product (GDP). Nearly half of Turkmenistan’s workforce is employed in the agriculture sector, which contributes just about 8% of the country’s GDP. It is significant to highlight that Turkmenistan only receives a little amount of FDI outside the energy industry. By promoting foreign investment in other industries including agriculture, textiles, construction, and tourism, the government has been attempting to diversify the economy. Despite having the fourth-largest natural resource reserves in the world, the country’s export potential is constrained by insufficient infrastructure.

The Central Asian Centre (CAC)system, which carries Turkmen gas to Russia, served as Turkmenistan’s primary conventional export route. When Turkmenistan originally declared its independence, Moscow officials thought that gas from Turkmenistan would be supplied to the market via the outdated pipeline network from the Soviet era at costs more favourable for Russia than Turkmenistan. By purchasing Turkmen gas at low prices to meet domestic demand and selling it to European states, Russia maintained its monopoly on the Turkmen market and generated significant profits from the largest European market. The CAC system is divided into two branches, the first of which transports gas from Turkmenistan to Russia via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and the second of which begins in the Caspian Sea and connects to the first branch in western Kazakhstan. The gas pipelines continue north from there, where they join the Russian gas pipeline network.

Due to a disagreement over natural gas prices, tensions between Turkmenistan and Russia started to increase in 2007. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkmenistan has sold natural gas to Russia at a discounted rate; nevertheless, the two nations have been unable to agree on gas pricing. Later in 2009, when Russia stopped accepting Turkmen gas, tensions between Turkmenistan and Russia grew much worse. In reaction to Turkmenistan’s rejection of the price proposed by Russia, this was done. Given that Turkmenistan is Russia’s primary natural gas supplier, the issue caused significant disruptions in the flow of gas to Europe. In 2010, when Russia and Turkmenistan agreed on a new pricing structure, the conflict was eventually addressed.

Due to the growth of energy ties and the quick supply of Turkmen gas in significant quantities to China, China has replaced Russia as Turkmenistan’s primary trading and economic partner. China is seen by Turkmenistan as a promising partner that has a need for gas and might help the country overcome its meagre natural gas exports. In December 2009, a brand-new gas pipeline project that runs across Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and the majority of China was finished.4 The first two gas pipelines have a combined capacity of 30 billion cubic metres of gas per year, while the third pipeline, which has a combined capacity of 25 billion cubic metres of gas per year, was finished at the end of 2014. An agreement on the construction of a fourth gas pipeline with a 25 billion cubic metre annual capacity has already been reached between Turkmenistan and China. The fourth gas pipeline is currently being built.

Iran receives Turkmen gas through two pipelines. By building the Korpeje-Kordkuy pipeline, Turkmenistan implemented a replacement for the outdated CAC system for the first time in 1997. It connects the nation’s gas with Iran and has a length of 200 kilometres and a capacity of 8 billion cubic metres.

The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline is an important alternative project supported by the government of Turkmenistan, but nevertheless overshadowed by geopolitical uncertainty in the region due to the instability of Afghanistan and the Kashmir issue. The planned length of the gas pipeline is 1,735 km, including 200 km on Turkmen territory, 773 km on Afghan territory and 827 km on Pakistani territory to a village on the border in India. The annual capacity of the pipeline is expected to reach 33 billion cubic meters, but due to geopolitical problems, this project may not have a future.

The goal of this project is to lessen Turkmenistan’s reliance on Russia. Turkmenistan might supply gas to Europe via the proposed Transcaspian gas pipeline, providing a substitute for Russian gas, but the project is stalled by objections from Russia and Iran. It will go 300 km (about 186.41 mi) down the Caspian Sea’s floor to Azerbaijan, where it will connect to the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline and possibly the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP).

Resource of Turkmenistan

As far as the agricultural make-up of Turkmenistan is concerned, following data show the country’s reliance on agriculture for its economy. In 2010, the agriculture sector of the country amounted to the sum of 12 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). It was about 24 percent in 2000. According to statistics from 2011, there are approximately 0.7 million people who are actively engaged in agriculture. That represents 29% of the total population. For small-scale productions, the residents of rural areas are given access to irrigable land, which can be as small as 0.01 ha or as large as 0.25 ha. Farmers typically cultivate fruits, vegetables, beans, and berries on their land in addition to raising cattle for milk and meat. Among the cultivated crops, wheat and rice are the main contributors to the nation’s food security. To address local food needs, the government sponsors irrigation and small-scale agriculture projects.

According to the Secretary General of the Economic Cooperation Organization, Halil Ibrahim Akca, connecting operational networks across sea, roadways and railways would enable the ECO region to take enormous strides forward as all the required resources exist on the Great Silk Road. Speaking at the international forum “Great Silk Road – Path to New Development Highs” on May 2, 2018, Ambassador Akca had this to say. He continued by saying that by improving regional infrastructure, transport, transit, and logistics, the socioeconomic circumstances of the region’s residents may be significantly enhanced.

A cutting-edge maritime transportation network across the Caspian Sea can be established with the help of the new $1.5 billion Turkmenbashi International Seaport. His administration has also made the neighboring. The main passenger harbor and cargo port is the new port, which is in Eastern Turkmenistan. It has a surface area of about 375 acres, ferry terminals, passenger-cargo terminals, and terminals for 17 vessels to be served simultaneously.

The Central Asia Centre (CAC) system has been used by Turkmenistan to export gas to Russia historically, but tensions between the two nations have increased as a result of disagreements over natural gas prices. With the signing of agreements for the construction of four gas pipelines, China has emerged as Turkmenistan’s top trading and economic partner. Aiming to enhance its gas exports to Europe via the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, Turkmenistan has also created export lines to Iran and India. Russia and Iran’s objection to the Trans-Caspian Pipeline project, as well as the legal status of the Caspian Sea and other geopolitical difficulties, all pose obstacles to its construction.

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The Fukushima reactors melted down in 2011 after a devastating earthquake and tsunami knocked out the power supply and cooling system, contaminating water within the plant. One decade later, Japan announced its plan to discharge Fukushima nuclear wastewater into the sea in 2021. Given this, the discussions on the hazards and illegality of this act have raised serious doubts about Japan’s sincerity in the international community. It is legitimate and understandable that countries neighboring Japan, such as China, Koreas along with other countries in the Pacific and beyond, have persuaded Japan and the international organizations involved to take efficient and responsible measures to tackle the issue. It is noted that once Fukushima nuclear wastewater is discharged into the sea, it will result in a serious hazard and cause social and economic impacts on all aspects.

Accordingly, Japan has the duty to handle the issue cautiously, countries neighboring Japan have the legitimate concerns with the measures taken by Japan and the attitudes of the IAEA, and the wealthy countries such as the G-7 member states have the morality and responsibility to act in line with international law and common standards on the Fukushima issue rather than taking the geopolitical affinity with Japan. However, radiation fears still persist after the IAEA said in its report that Japan’s plan to dump nuclear-contaminated wastewater into the Pacific Ocean was “consistent with global safety standards.” Yet, it will inevitably lead to a long-time uncertain issue in history since there are too many technical questions unanswered and various humane concerns with the potential harms in the next decades. Even in Japan where the protesters gathered to rally against Japan’s plan, expressing their grave concern over the final report by the UN nuclear watchdog.

Historically, since the late 19th century, the world saw the heyday of the European-American expansion globally. Amid this, Japan rapidly became the first non-Western country to defeat Russia which was one of the leading powers in Europe, even though it did only in a military term. After that, Japan committed to pursuing the power politics and eventually once again became the first Asian country admitted to the peer council of the League of Nations in 1920, followed by the Washington treaties in 1922 which further recognized Japan as one of the major powers along with the United States, Britain and France. In the next two decades, however, Japan outrageously caused the tremendous damages and human sufferings to its neighbors and also in the Pacific, but it is also true that Japan suffered a great loss in national terms and then became the first victim of the nuclear bomb in history at the end of the war. Taking the lessons from its aggression, Japan in the post-war decades has made all earnest efforts to become the first and only Asian member state of the G-7 thus far, which is dubbed as the “rich nations club” of the world.

This narrative aims to show that today Japan has developed general capacity and leverages to act as a major power independently and perhaps responsibly in the world affairs. As a sovereign state, Japan has dreamed of restoring its old glory as a dominant power in Asia, continuing its current path through allying with the U.S.-led Western bloc and seizing the opportunity to return to the limelight of the world stage whenever it is possible. Diplomatically, Japan is one of the key allies of the United States in Asia as American military bases are located on its soil. In addition, Japan is the third largest economy backed up by its robust high-tech research and development. Yet, culturally and psychologically, as Henry Kissinger opined previously that Japanese foreign policy was much like a family enterprise which saw itself in rivalry with a world of impersonal, potentially hostile corporate competitors seen as forever remote and ultimately perhaps incomprehensible. As a result, this cultural abyss produces a strange and sometimes frustrating pattern in negotiations between Japan and the other sovereign states of the world.

For sure, Japan has claimed having all the rights to protect its core interests and immediate security concerns. Given the “anarchic” nature of the international system which was rooted in the Westphalian system since the 17th century, sovereignty has referred to “a complete freedom of action” to preserve state’s independence. Yet, in foreign affairs where sovereign states interact with each other in terms of realpolitik, no supranational authority stands above them. However, as a main concept, sovereignty has actually caused so much intellectual confusion and international lawlessness. First, sovereignty is by no means above the law. Second, sovereignty refers only to supreme power within each state. Therefore, the principle of the equality of states comes to define the “same rights and responsibilities” to all member states of the international society. As a matter of fact, since the Vienna Congress in 1815, the sovereign equality of states meant a regime of, by, and for government of states, regardless of their size, wealth and power.

Japan is a highly-developed country with a super-advanced technology. Though homeland is quite unimpressive, it has been associated with the Western trade and economic system for more than one century and politically allying with them for 70 years. Literally Japan has the core allies and multi-level partners globally, and they have possessed all necessary power, capabilities and resources to tackle efficiently the contaminated water and countless other public issues if they want to do. Given this, this writing aims to present three tips to Japan or Japanese authorities in Tokyo on how to deal with the contaminated water professionally and honestly in a win-win way. First, Japan has been noted with its reputation of dedication to public cleaning. And Japanese people have high taste for food quality and water safety as well. If the contaminated water is purified and safe, why is it necessary to dump it in the ocean rather than turning it into the bottled water for domestic use? Suppose the domestic market of Japan is marginal, the allies of Japan such as the U.S., Canada and Australia can show their friendship to import the purified water from Japan to serve their respective domestic needs. Second, if the contaminated water is purified but not safe for drinking, it is still necessary to flow it in the domestic lakes, or pragmatically irrigating their crops fields including national parks, public gardens or private courtyards. Third, Japan and most of its allies or partners around the world are wealthy countries with better technologies and finances. In the case of the Fukushima contaminated water, they are able to take all necessary measures to minimize the damages from the nuclear-waste water. Otherwise, it may take years or decades to find the convincing ways and reliable data to demonstrate their dedication, responsibilities and morality in foreign affairs.

From the very beginning, China has reiterated that Japan’s legitimate rights and proper concerns should be respected and understood. Yet, Japan’s plan to puts money above human life and health can’t be acceptable. As such an advanced country with many leading technological allies, Japan should have multiple approaches to the disposal of nuclear contaminated water in a scientific, safe, transparent and consultative manner, such as long-term storage, hydrogen release, ground injection, underground burial, and vapor release. Yet, Japan has pretentiously chosen to minimize its own costs and risks while letting the world take nuclear contamination risks now and in the future. Therefore, Japan should be urged “not to be the first country in the 21st century to trespass the common interests and shared security concerns of the international community.

As the largest neighbor country to Japan, China wish Japan succeed in tackling the issue of Fukushima contaminated water and verify itself with deeds a responsible and friendly power in Asia and beyond.

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